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ABSTRACT
Since Ghana’s oil discovery in 2007, the question of how the resource will bene t a ected 
communities and who holds the responsibly is still a subject of debate. Will the bene ts 
be negotiated by local actors or will bene ts  ow automatically from the state and oil 
companies? Guided by the actor-oriented theoretical foundation, the paper qualitatively 
examines how di erent actors have emerged in the Western Region of Ghana to negotiate 
for bene ts from the oil  nd. Two qualitative case studies were conducted on  sher folks 
and youth groups to examine the processes, dynamics and outcomes of their negotiations. 
The results show that disenfranchised youth and  sher folks, who feel dispossessed of 
their livelihood, have resorted to social mobilisation and contentious political bargaining 
strategies to negotiate for their benefits and to channel their grievances. Alternative 
livelihoods, jobs for locals and improvement in social infrastructural development are 
the primary requests of the local actors. The paper concludes that local actors’ interests 
are varied and negotiations are largely unregulated. Local actors constantly accuse 
oil companies for not prioritising their needs. State coherent policies and structures 
to mediate the negotiation processes between local actors, companies and the state are 
therefore recommended to avoid violent con icts.
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INTRODUCTION
Since Ghana’s commercial oil discovery in    7 and subsequent production in 
    , the local communities along the coast of the Western Region have remained 
expectant of benefits and commensurate compensation packages (Nkrumah, 
Aklorbortu & Suazo,    8; Bouten, Everaert, Van Liedekerke, De Moor, & 
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Christiaens,     ; Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Ghana,     ; Obeng-Odoom,     ; 
Mohammed, Kpieta & Owusu-Sekyere,    4; Owusu,    4; Owusu & Boatemah, 
   4).Of course, several concerns have been raised by  shing communities along 
the coast about how their livelihoods are endangered by restrictions imposed 
on their fishing activities and sea pollution resulting from oil exploration and 
production(Ackah-Baidoo,     ; Mohammed et al.,    4). According to Ackah-Baidoo 
(    ),  sher folks have attributed the proliferation of strange sea weeds which 
are a ecting  shing activities to oil production on the coast of Western Region. 
Some studies on the socio-economic impacts of the oil find in Ghana indicated 
high costs of housing and landed properties along the coast of Western Region 
due to immigration and commercial land acquisition for oil related infrastructure 
development due to oil exploitation in the region(Edem,     ; Yalley & Ofori-Darko, 
    ). Undeniably, many oil producing countries experience similar socio-economic 
challenges as well as severe air, land and water pollution, with disastrous impacts 
on health and livelihoods (Pyagbara,    7; Yakovleva,     ; Ackah-Baidoo,     ; 
O’Faircheallaigh,     ; Cuba, Bebbington, Rogan, & Millones,    4; Okuthe,    5; 
Plänitz & Kuzu,    5).
The literature largely agrees that globally, people living in extractive areas are not 
satis ed with the bene ts they derive from resource extraction (Esteves,    8; 
Sawyer & Gomez,     ). Local populations have often expected that the extraction 
of resources would not displace them from their traditional livelihood activities. 
However, extractive companies have largely failed to meet this expectation, leading 
to di erent interest groups emerging at di erent levels to negotiate on behalf of 
extraction-affected communities and indigenous populations. The negotiation 
processes have often resulted in con icts and civil wars between disgruntled local 
populations and extractive companies in many extractive countries, especially 
those in Africa (Global Witness,    7; O’Faircheallaigh,     ; Obi,    4). In Sierra 
Leone, the      to      civil war was largely associated with diamond mining 
where illegal diamond trade and export was the main sources of  nancing the war 
(Maconachie & Binns,    7). Obi (   4) also associated the recurring con icts in the 
Niger Delta Region to the presence of oil and gas production in the region.
The occurrence of these con icts has been largely attributed to imbalance between 
the resource extraction and the benefits to local population whose livelihoods 
and social conditions are a ected by extraction (Obi,    4). Gary and Karl (    ) 
and Maconachie et al. (   4) observed that the rights of local populations have 
often been tampered with, resulting in adverse environmental impact, poor 
compensations, poor benefit sharing, limited employment and development in 
resource extraction areas. In Nigeria for instance, multinational oil companies 
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(MNOCs) have received severe criticism by both local and international pressure 
groups for engaging in unwholesome health, safety and environmental practices 
resulting in widespread ecological disturbances. As a result, protests from host 
communities have escalated into an all-out assault on oil companies and their 
workers leading to destruction of both onshore and offshore oil facilities and 
infrastructure (Bannon & Collier,     ; Dabup,     ; Obi,    4). Dabup (    ) 
con rms that in some instances, shutting downs oil wells and recurrent cases of 
kidnapping of workers by rebel groups occur in the Niger Delta Region.
From the actor-oriented theoretical approach, the paper examines the development 
of local actors in the nascent oil sector in Ghana and how these actors negotiate 
for their respective bene ts from the oil resource. Proponents of the extractive 
led development of local populations have often argued from the liberal economic 
theoretical perspective that resource extraction will automatically trickle down 
associated benefits to local populations through national and sub-national 
structures (Campbell,     ). In liberal economic theory, it is assumed that the 
presence of extractive industries in rural and remote regions will invariably bene t 
local population since the extractive industries would employ locals and pay them 
higher wages than their traditional economic activities. The literature however 
demonstrates that the liberal economic perspective has not yielded the expected 
bene ts to local population. This has resulted in the several agitations and con icts 
between extractive companies and local populations across extractive countries 
(Bunker,   84; Bannon and Collier,     ; Barrow,     ; Bebbington, Cuba et al., 
   4; Bond,    4; Cuba, Bebbington et al.,    4; Obi,    4).
Departing from the liberal economic theory is the actor-oriented theory which 
has been applied extensively in contemporary research in the extractive sector 
(Long,     ; Obi,     ; Laube,    7; Tsuma,     ; Mahmood and Humphrey,     ; 
Islam, Kimihiko et al.,    4). The term actor has become common in the extractive 
sector literature and societal negotiation for local bene ts. Actors are de ned as 
persons, groups, organizations that are capable of making decisions and acting in 
a more or less coordinated way (Burns, Baumgartner et al.,   85; Herman,    5). In 
other words, they are action-units, individuals or groups who are driven by either 
common or competing interest in any given phenomenon (Long,     ; Laube,    7; 
Tsuma,     ).The actor-oriented paradigm unlike the liberal economic perspective 
embraces the roles played by individual and group actors in determining 
development outcomes. Spearheaded by Norman Long (    ) he argued that, 
although it may be true that certain important structural changes result from the 
impact of outside forces (controlled by the market or the state), it is theoretically 
unsatisfactory to base one’s analysis about social change on the concept of external 
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determination of the outcomes of development (Long,     ).Long (    ), argued 
that social actors are not simply seen as disintegrated individuals without interests, 
nor are they passive recipients of outside interventions, but are active participants 
who process information and strategise in their dealings with various local actors 
as well as with outside institutions and personnel to in uence change. He further 
argued strongly that the presence of any development intervention cannot be 
imposed from outside but depends on the interactions, negotiations, and struggles 
that take place between several kinds of actors in a given society. In his analysis 
of the political economy of the Nigerian oil sector, Obi (    ), recognised the roles 
played by youth and women as actors not only at the local scene but also at the 
national level where they connect their interests to global level actors.
Local Bene ts Negotiation Strategies in Extractive Sector
Literature has often described negotiation as events of diplomatic artistry or 
rational decision-making processes. However, in certain circumstances negotiations 
are undiplomatic (Lewicki, Barry, & Saunders,    7). All negotiations are similar in 
that they involve people taking initial positions, o ering proposals to help resolve 
the con ict, making counter-proposals, o ering concessions, and coming to an 
agreement. However, negotiations can be distinguished according to the strategy 
and tactics that are used to conduct them. Literature shows that di erent strategies 
have been employed by local actors globally in negotiating for local bene ts from 
extractive resources. Most common negotiation strategies in the extractive sector 
include; contentious politics, social movement, political bargaining, strategic 
groups and networking among others.
Contentious political negotiation strategies have been used extensively by local 
actors in the extractive industry (Bannon & Collier,     ; Obi,     ).It is the 
interaction process in which various actors make claims bearing on someone else’s 
interest, in which governments or companies appear either as targets (Tilly,    8; 
Tarrow & Tilly,     ). It is the use of disruptive techniques to make a political 
point, or to change government or company policy in line with the interest of local 
actors particular in the extractive sector (Bebbington,     ). Examples of such 
techniques are actions that disturb the normal activities of extractive companies 
such as: demonstrations, riots, terrorism, civil disobedience, and even insurrection 
or revolution(Tilly,     ). The use of contentious politics by disgruntled local 
populations has been documented in the extractive sector literature, particularly 
in Africa, Asia and Latin America (Akabzaa,     ; Bannon et al.,     ; Bebbington, 
Humphreys, Bury, Lingan, Muñoz & Scurra,    8; Tsuma,     ; Offiong,     ; 
Ogula,     ; O’Faircheallaigh,     ; Cuba, et al.,    4; Obi,    4; Owen & Kemp, 
   4). Contentious negotiation strategies have the advantage of drawing quick 
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attention of extractive companies and national government to the interest of local 
actors due to the disruptive tendencies on operations and pro t. Nonetheless, strict 
application of this negotiation strategy has been catastrophic and has not yielded 
much bene t to local actors in several extractive communities (Tsuma,     ; Obi, 
   4).
Social movement is another negotiation strategy employed by local actors in 
negotiating for bene ts in the extractive sector. Social movement enhances local 
empowerment and citizen activism and provides support for local people to hold 
states accountable in resource management (Bebbington, Bebbington et al.,    8). 
Social movements have di erent motives, including but not limited to contesting 
colonization of extractive resources and protesting against activities that are 
inimical to livelihoods. Bebbington Cuba et al. (   4), observed that there might 
be di erent actors within social movement in the extractive sector which may act 
di erently for di erent interests at any given time. Recent studies have shown 
that several civil rights movements, environmental and feminist movements, 
and revolts against authoritarianism have become common worldwide, especially 
in the extractive sector, and masses of people have been brought onto the streets 
demanding change in resource distribution (Tarrow,    4; Global Witness,    7; 
Bebbington, Humphreys Bebbington et al.,    8; Esteves,    8; Tarrow & Tilly, 
    ; Tsuma,     ; Barrow,     ). Tarrow and Tilly (    ) noted that these actions 
sometimes succeeded and others failed. They, however, opined that even when such 
actions failed, their movements had lasting e ects, and set in motion important 
political and international changes (Tarrow & Tilly,     ).
Strategic group and networking strategies are also employed by local actors in 
negotiating for benefits from the extractive sector. This perspective has been 
spearheaded by Evers and Benedikter (    ), where they de ned strategic group 
as group of actors in a given social and geographic setting which are aiming at a 
similar approach or strategic plan of gaining access and control of environmental 
resources. Ever and Benedikter (    ), are of the view that whenever new resources 
are made available in a given context, di erent groups of actors emerge with an 
aim of gaining control of these resources.While popular class theory has either 
perceived resource struggle as being between elites or the higher class, strategic 
group theory sees the struggle not necessarily amongst the elite group. Strategic 
groups in the natural resource sector may form coalitions to gain control of the 
benefits and most importantly, the opportunity to restructure the patterns of 
resource exchange and distribution (Evers and Benedikter,     ; Tsuma,     ). Even 
though an alliance between strategic groups might produce favourable conditions 
for better bene ts, this process may also provoke reactions, movements, uprisings 
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and possibly a revolution, which indeed, is often the case for most developing oil 
producing countries (Gelb,   88; Manzano,     ; ECCR,     ; Henstridge,     ; 
O’Faircheallaigh,     ). This strategy is often used by local groups such as youth 
groups, community development associations and non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs). This strategy enables them mobilise local citizens for collective actions to 
advocate for the rights of the local populations a ected by resources extraction(Obi, 
    ; Bebbington et al.,    8; Tsuma,     ; Campbell,     ; Bebbington et al.,    4).
Political bargaining is another strategy employed by local actors in negotiating for 
local bene ts of resources extraction (Levinson, Smith & Wilson,     ; Lewicki, et 
al.,    7; Leigh, Thompson, Jiunwen, & Gunia,     ).The institutions that control 
the distribution of extractive resources and political power are created by political 
entrepreneurs through election by the local population. In pursuing their own 
interests, the political entrepreneurs engage in negotiations with local actors on 
mutual concessions to trade local bene ts of extractive resources for votes (Doron 
& Sened,     ). In the extractive sector it is common for politicians to engage 
local populace in negotiation where the local populace is promised some forms of 
bene ts from resources extraction in exchange of votes during elections (Doron 
et al.,     ; Bannon et al.,     ; Bebbington et al.,    8; Bebbington et al.,    4). 
Fisher and Ury (  8 ) supported by Adler and Elmhorst (   5), have described this 
type of negotiation as soft positional bargaining which emphasizes the importance 
of building relationships.
It is worth noting that, these negotiation strategies explained above are not 
mutually exclusive. Actors sometimes combine these strategies in one way or the 
other to achieve their targets. Whiles contentious political negotiation strategies 
are dominating in the literature as the most common strategy employed by local 
actors, strategies such as political bargaining and strategic groups networking are 
becoming common especially in democratic societies in developing countries. Social 
movement strategies are very common in Latin America and gaining grounds in 
Africa in recent times (Bebbington et al.,    4; Obi,    4).
METHODS
The paper is purely qualitative and is based on case study of two key local actors in 
bene t negotiation in the coastal districts of the Western Region of Ghana. To better 
understand in detail how the various social groups (actors) interact and negotiate 
for bene ts from the oil resources in Ghana, the case study qualitative method of 
inquiry was deemed appropriate. According to Thomas (    ), case study is a kind 
of qualitative research that concentrates on one thing or issue or phenomenon, 
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looking at it in detail, and not seeking to generalise from it. His emphasis is that 
case study is about the particular rather than the general. Qualitative case study is 
viewed as an approach to research that facilitates the exploration of a phenomenon 
within its context using a variety of data sources (Baxter & Jack,    8).According 
to Thomas (    ), a case can be viewed as a situation/event. As an event, a case is 
about the happening and the set of circumstances that surround this happening. 
Therefore a case study is about explaining the interrelationships between the 
elements of your study taking evidence from your empirical work and making 
arguments to connect elements of your observation (Thomas,     ). According to 
Baxter and Jack (   8), a case in short is the unit of analysis in conducting the 
research. From this background my case study is the negotiation processes of actors 
for local bene ts from the oil and gas sector.
In order to determine specific events in which negotiations occurred or are 
ongoing between local actors, oil and gas companies and the state, I embarked on 
series of  eld visits to the six coastal districts of the Western Region. Upon series 
of discussions with community opinion leaders, district assemblies and Non-
governmental Organisations (NGOs), several events were found, which demonstrate 
how local actors had negotiated or are negotiating for bene ts from the oil and gas 
industry. Two of these events that is, negotiation between youth groups and oil and 
gas companies as well as negotiation between  sher folks and oil companies were, 
however, selected purposively because they showed clear processes of negotiation 
among di erent actors. The two actor groups; the  sher folks and youth are unique 
and were assertive in their demands for local benefits.Each of the phenomena 
selected therefore represented a case study. In this regard, the multiple case 
approach was applied. According to Stake (   5) cited in (Thomas,     ), whenever 
a number of cases have to be studied jointly in order to investigate a phenomenon, 
multiple case study approach has to be applied.
Data was collected as part of PhD thesis research in the area which lasted for about 
 8 months from January    5 to December    7. Di erent qualitative data collection 
strategies were employed. Key informants in each actor group were identi ed and 
several in-depth interviews were conducted among the key informants in the 
selected case studies. Table   shows distribution of the category of respondents in 
the two case studies.
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Table  : Categories of respondents for the study
Actor Category Respondent Sex Total
Male Female
Fisher Folks
Canoe Owners and  shers     8
Chief Fishermen    
Leaders of Fish Mongers    
Executives of Ghana Canoe Fishermen Association at District 
Level
4    
Fish Venders   5 7
Youth Groups
Executives of Ahanta Youth Association 4    
Executives of Nzema Youth Association 5   7
Total         
Source: Field Data,     
Five focus group discussions (FGDs) were held for  sher folks one each at Dixcove, 
Butre, Axim, Cape Three Points and Half Asini. Two FGDs were also held with the 
Nzema Youth Association and the Ahanta Youth Associations. Notwithstanding 
that each FGD was guided by structured questions, several follow-up questions were 
asked during the FGD to seek clari cations and to probe for further information 
from participants.
The two case studies were run concurrently and in-depth face-to-face interviews 
were conducted to respondents based on their availability. Interviews were 
conducted on each case until saturation levels reached and no further interviews 
were necessary to establish the cases. Detailed field notes were taken during 
interviews alongside tape-recording. The typed interviews were transcribed and 
thematically analysed. Analytical memos were developed out of the  eld notes to 
guide the structure of the paper. The results are presented in narratives to portray 
the voices of the respondents.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
This section presents detail rendition of how the two actor groups are negotiating 
for bene ts from the oil and gas resources in the Western Region and the negotiation 
strategies they employ. The results are being discussed with reference to literature 
and the theoretical framework guiding the study.
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Fisher Folks Negotiation for Oil and Gas Bene ts
Marine  shing is the main economic activity of the entire coastal districts in the 
Western Region employing about  5% of inhabitants (Ghana Statistical Service, 
    ). Ackah-Baidoo (    ), con rms this assertion and emphasised that  shing is 
the main driver of the local economy in the coastal communities in Ghana (Ackah-
Baidoo,     ).
Since oil production in      however, several concerns have been raised by  sher 
folks on the entire coast of the Western Region. Ackah-Baidoo (    ), in particular 
reported on the growth of sargassum (free- oating seaweeds) as a result of the oil 
extraction. This according to her has adversely a ected  shing. Although the blame 
of the decline in yield of  sh harvest on oil production has been contested by the 
oil companies,  sher folks have constantly argued that their livelihoods are under 
threat. They indicated that  shing in deep sea waters now has several restrictions, 
as the oil companies have positioned several exploration and production oil vessels 
and rigs with bu er zones limiting the activities of  shing at sea. A 4 -year old 
fisherman at Butre, expressed his frustration; “We used to travel every part of 
the sea for  sh without anybody stopping us, but now because of their ‘Apolo ’, we 
cannot move freely to search for  sh” (Fisherman at FGD, June    5).
Respondents also attributed the low harvest to the presence of the oil rigs which attract 
 shes because of the high lights installed on them. According to a 4  year old  sherman 
at Dixcove;
 We agree that some times in the past, before oil production, the fish 
harvest could be low in some seasons and that is normal. Our concern is 
that since oil production started, we have witnessed a consistent decline 
and sometimes we  nd dead whales and sharks onshore. This was not 
happening before the oil discovery in our area. If the oil companies are 
denying our claim, why is it that similar things are not happening in Cape 
Coast or Accra where they also  sh? (Chief  sherman at Dixcove, July 
2015).
The main interest of  sher folks is to get alternative livelihoods to supplement 
 shing which has come under threat as a result of oil production. To achieve this 
interest,  sher folks are adopting di erent negotiation strategies. Strategic alliance 
and collaboration with civil society organisations has become a common approach. 
For instance, the District and Regional Canoe Fishermen’s Councils have initiated 
a strong collaboration with the Friends of the Nation NGO to ensure that the 
  The respondents referred to the oil rigs at sea as ‘Apolo’ which according to them is a name adopted 
from  shermen in Cote D’Ivoire.
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concerns and interest of  sher folks are taken into consideration in the planning 
and budgeting of oil and gas companies as well as the government decentralised 
system. New negotiation strategies proposed are to ensure more collaboration with 
the oil and gas companies to plan and implement cooperate social responsibility 
(CSR) projects. The oil companies have agreed to initiate all CSR projects with the 
consent and inputs of  sher folks so that the  sher folks own the projects upon 
completion. NGOs such as the Western Region Coastal Foundation, Friends of the 
Nation (FoN) and United Civil Society Organisations for National Development 
(UCSOND) are providing technical support to  sher folks in this regard.
 We think if the NGOs work closely with us to understand our needs, 
they can mediate our negotiations with the oil and gas companies. Our 
only problem is that some of the NGOs are supporting the oil and gas 
companies and promoting their interests. Anyway, we know the good 
ones and will collaborate with them to promote our interests (Mr Ansah a 
member of the Ahanta West branch of the Canoe Fishermen Council, June 
2015).
The  sher folks have also resorted to political bargaining as a negotiation strategy 
with government. During the      Presidential and Parliamentary elections, the 
 sher folks in the Ahanta-West Constituency accused the incumbent Member of 
Parliament (MP) for not championing their interests to the government and oil 
companies and therefore, vowed not to vote for him. Some leaders of the  sher 
folks openly campaigned against the MP and supported the opposition candidate 
in the election. The  sher folks had a series of meetings and discussions with the 
opposition candidate and he promised to champion their interests in parliament 
when voted for. He also promised to discuss the interests of  sher folks with the 
oil and gas companies so as to in uence their decisions on investing in the coastal 
 shing communities.
 The two main parliamentary candidates of NDC and NPP for the 2016 
general elections met us on separate meetings to discuss their plans for 
 sher folks. The NDC candidate who was incumbent MP had failed us for 
8 years. We were convinced with the NPP candidate’s plans. He promised 
to help us gain better benefits from the oil resources. He promised 
to ensure that substantial amount of the oil revenue is invested on 
development of  shing communities in the Western Region. We trust the 
candidate and asked our members to vote for him (Mr. Ko  a member of 
the Ahanta West branch of the Canoe Fishermen Council, June 2015).
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Eventually, the opposition NPP candidate won the Parliamentary election. The hope 
of the  sher folks is that the MP would honour his promise and ensure maximum 
bene ts from the oil and gas resources. While this political bargaining and lobbying 
are on-going, the  sher folks have vowed to use all possible means of negotiations 
to achieve their bene ts from the oil industry.
So far,  sher folks have described their bene ts from the oil resources as abysmal 
and highly insu cient to compensate for the losses they have incurred due to oil 
exploration and production. Respondent recounted some few bene ts such as plastic 
chairs and  at screen televisions donated to some  shing communities during the 
     and    4 FIFA World Cup Tournament, scholarships for basic education and 
postgraduate studies, small-town water projects among others. Some of the  sher 
folks felt that the collaborative negotiation strategies are not yielding enough 
benefits as the oil companies are adamant to their requests. Some contentious 
negotiation strategies are being adopted by some  shermen in the area. Fishermen 
will intentionally encroach the bu er zones where the oil rigs are located with the 
intention of provoking the oil companies. The  shermen vowed to continue  shing 
near the rigs until the oil companies and government initiate appropriate platforms 
for  sher folks to negotiate. Some other  shermen are also considering forming a 
militia group to  ght their cause. To corroborate this Tomo (   5) indicated that 
some youth  shermen had planned to form a rebel group called ‘Cape Militia. Some 
of the  shermen at Cape Three Points stated;
 We have seen in videos from the Niger Delta in Nigeria where communities 
a ected by oil production have formed militia groups and as a result, 
they gain recognition and bene ts from oil companies and government. 
We may consider such an option when the current situation continues 
where companies are ignoring our demands (FGD with Fishermen at Cape 
Three Points, 13th June, 2015).
Negotiation for Oil and Gas Bene ts by Concerned 
Youth and Grassroots Movements
The emergence of youth associations as actors in the negotiation for oil bene ts on 
the coast of Western Region is an extension from the mining sector and is instigated 
by the growing general youth unemployment in Ghana, in particular the coastal 
communities (Ghana Statistical Service,    4). Many of the youth became very 
happy when the oil was discovered in    7 not only because of the potential revenue 
for the state, but largely because of potential job opportunities. Darkwah (    ), and 
the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Ghana (    ), have noted high job expectations among 
the youth in Ghana particularly, those living along the coast of Western Region 
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since the oil discovery and production in     . Darkwah (    ) noted a proliferation 
of specialised trainings for the youth which is organised by both local and foreign 
training institutions in anticipation of jobs in the oil and gas industry.
It is evident that the main interest of the youth in the coastal districts is to get 
jobs in the oil and gas sector. The fundamental question, however, is which areas 
in the oil and gas industry will the youth  t? Several analyses of local employment 
potentials of the oil industry in developing countries suggest that the sector 
requires special skills and expertise. But most often local indigenes lack such 
skills (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Ghana,     ; Darkwah,     ; Cuba et al.,    4). 
The problem of who has the responsibility to develop the skills of local people 
to meet the requirement of the nascent oil industry in Ghana is still a subject of 
political debate. Ghana as part of its local content and local participation policy 
has mandated oil and gas companies to employ skilled local folks and transact 
business with those with appropriate documentations. But the oil companies have 
expressed concern about the lack of skills and competencies among local people and 
businesses, making it di cult to engage them in the industry.
Although several respondents alluded to the fact that they lack the requisite skills 
for employment in the oil industry, they were con dent in getting menial jobs such 
as security and driving. Others were also optimistic that with training, they could 
develop relevant skills to meet the requirement of the oil industry. Some youth at 
Dixcove were very optimistic and stated;
 We are not looking for technical jobs; after all we have not gone to higher 
schools. What we are sure is that we can do watchman, security and 
cleaning jobs in the oil companies’ o ces. These ones too we need so much 
skills and training? We are here and the companies bring watchmen and 
cleaners from Accra. Why can’t they employ us and give us such training 
as they o er to those employed from outside our communities? (FGD, at 
Dixcove, 22/03/2016).
As a strategy of getting the attention of the oil companies and government, the 
youth in the coastal districts have resorted to the formation of youth associations 
and revival of old ones that had been dormant. The proliferation of youth 
associations to negotiate for bene ts is largely due to the lack of trust of the youth 
in state regulatory agencies to seek the economic welfare of the youth. Peter, a 
  -yearold and member of the Dixcove Youth Club indicated;
 Since the oil discovery in 2007, we were promised that several jobs would 
come to our community and we the youth will get jobs. Since then we have 
seen nothing. All we see is that several people are employed from Accra 
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and brought to work in the oil companies. The district assemblies and 
our chiefs are doing nothing to help us get our share from this oil. We 
therefore have to come together to  ght our own cause (FGD at Dixcove, 
23/01/2016).
Similar views such as the one expressed by Peter are held by several youth across the 
six coastal districts, leading to the formation of youth associations. At Half Assini 
in the Jomoro District, members of the Nzema Youth Association saw the need to 
revive their old but dormant association formed in    8 to serve as a mouth piece 
for them to negotiate for special bene ts from the oil industry. The formation of 
youth associations as actors in the local bene ts negotiation is being encouraged 
by several other actors. The NGOs, the district assemblies, chiefs, and even the oil 
companies, see the formation of the youth associations as very relevant. The oil 
companies for instance, see the youth associations as strong forces for community 
development since the youth are the main active group in most of the communities. 
NGOs such as Friends of the Nation and UCSOND con rmed having to work closely 
with youth associations during community mobilisation and sensitisation on oil 
and gas issues. Obi (    ) observed that the youth are a critical factor in discussing 
development in the Nigerian oil sector because they represent the intelligentsia and 
future leaders of every community. Some of the youth associations are receiving 
support from the oil and gas companies in line with their requests. At Dixcove, the 
Youth Club received support from Tullow Oil Ghana and Kosmos Energy in their 
joint community development initiative to build a computer laboratory for training 
the youth in ICT skills for the oil industry. The youth also attributed the building of 
the Skills Training Centre at Takoradi Polytechnic to their constant advocacy for a 
special skills development for the oil industry.
It is worth noting that ethnic di erentiations in the Western Region are re ecting 
in the development of youth associations. For instances, youth associations from 
the Ahanta ethnic group have the feeling that those of Nzema descent are more 
favoured by the oil companies. This view was openly expressed by some youth of 
the Ahanta communities.
 We the youth from the Ahanta Areas have been left out in this whole oil 
business. When it comes to where the oil is found, we believe that it is 
closer to the Ahanta areas. For instance, they always refer to areas such 
as Cape Three Points as the location of the oil and Cape Three Points is in 
Ahanta land. Why should it be that they are not prioritising our areas? 
We believe that current leaders in government managing the oil industry 
are from the Nzema areas and are working for them (FGD, Cape Three 
Points, 07/02/2016).
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Literature acknowledges that most youth activism have taken ethnic identity. In 
most cases the youth protest against marginalisation and resistance against any 
form of exclusion of their ethnic groups from the bene ts of extractive resources 
(Obi     , Tsuma     , Obi    4). The formation of the National Youth Council of 
the Ogoni People and Ijaw Youth Congress are examples of such ethnic biased youth 
groups formed for negotiating bene ts for the local folks in Nigeria (Obi     ).
CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
The paper has provided evidence of negotiations taking place between local actors 
and oil and gas companies. The  ndings con rm that local actors are employing 
different strategies in their negotiations. From the actor oriented theoretical 
perspective it is clear from the study that although the state and companies 
through policies and institutions may facilitate the process of local benefits to 
local population, the direct actions or inactions of the local actors themselves will 
determine when and how those bene ts will be accrued and distributed. As noted 
by Long (    ), local actors are not passive recipients of development interventions 
but are participants capable of influencing the decisions of companies through 
series of negotiation strategies.
It is worth arguing, based on the findings that the presence of proactive local 
actors championing local bene ts negotiations in the Western Region signi es the 
existence of an organised social and political system, conducive for dialogue and 
community engagement. Although the study found several collective actions by 
local actors which can be described as contentious, such actions as explained in the 
paper have not assumed violent proportions comparable to those for instance, in 
the Niger Delta in Nigeria. It is therefore important for the oil and gas companies 
and government to recognise this as opportunity to create the enabling negotiation 
space to stimulate healthy negotiation that will be bene cial to local actors, oil and 
gas companies and the state. It is however noted that, the absence of state policy 
to mediate local bene ts negotiations between oil and gas companies and local 
actors gives room for unregulated negotiations which may turn the current very 
less violent negotiations process between local actors, oil and gas companies and 
the state into violent ones.
Therefore, as Ghana celebrates its new oil and gas discovery and associated 
potentials for national development, it is important to recognise the interests of 
local population and actors a ected by oil and gas production. Prioritising these 
interest groups by both oil and gas companies and government will reduce the 
current feeling of neglect by the local population in the Western Region. It will 
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also provide opportunity for healthy negotiations between local actors and oil 
industry players, a situation which is not common in many oil producing countries 
in developing countries. State coherent policies and structures to mediate the 
negotiation processes between local actors, companies and the state are therefore 
recommended to avoid violent conflicts in the Ghana oil and gas sectors. More 
sensitisations need to be given to local actors to understand the oil and gas industry 
so as to reduce the high expectations for local bene ts. The work of civil society 
is therefore highly recommended to support build a strong local actor population 
capable of negotiating professionally for local bene ts in the oil and gas sector.
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